The day nothing happened: Ten years after the IANA transition

What IANA does and why oversight matters

For the Internet to function as one global network, certain resources and identifiers must be coordinated. Domain names need a common root. Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) must be allocated without conflicts. Protocols need agreed parameters so that equipment and software from different manufacturers can communicate.

The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) maintains the authoritative registries that make this possible: the registries of protocol parameters, the DNS root zone and the global pools of IP addresses and AS numbers.

IANA does not determine the policies governing these resources. Its role is to coordinate and implement policies developed and agreed upon by the communities that depend on them.

Since ICANN took responsibility for the IANA functions, the US government, through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), retained contractual oversight of these functions including verifying that changes to the DNS root zone followed established procedures.

In March 2014, the the NTIA, announced its intention to relinquish that role. But there was an important condition: the global Internet community had to agree on a replacement that would preserve the Internet's security, stability and openness, without transferring oversight to another government or intergovernmental organisation.

The challenge was straightforward to describe, but much harder to solve: how could a multistakeholder community take responsibility for functions on which the entire Internet depends?

Making the transition happen: building a new model of stewardship

The answer emerged through the IANA Stewardship Transition, coordinated by a group of 30 representatives selected by 13 communities spanning governments, civil society, business, registries and the technical community.

The IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG) did not develop the plan itself. Instead, it asked each of the three operational communities to produce their own proposals: the IETF community for protocol parameters, the names community for domain names and the numbers community for IP addresses and ASNs. The ICG then brought these proposals together and submitted the combined plan for public comment. In parallel, the ICANN community developed new accountability mechanisms to ensure that ICANN would remain answerable to the wider community rather than to a single government.

Netnod was directly involved in this work: Lars-Johan Liman represented the Root Server System Advisory Committee (RSSAC), which he co-chaired, on the ICG; I represented the Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC), which I chaired, and I also served as one of the ICG's vice chairs.

The three operational communities faced different challenges. The numbers and protocol parameters proposals were completed early and were ready for implementation independently of the remaining work. The names proposal was more closely tied to the wider reforms of ICANN's accountability mechanisms.

The technical community brought an essential perspective to the negotiations: whatever governance arrangements emerged, the Internet's critical functions had to continue operating reliably.

The process took two and a half years and considerable patience. Ultimately, the community produced a proposal that met the NTIA's requirements.

On 1 October 2016, the contract expired and the transition took effect.

Ten years on: did it work?

By its most fundamental measure, the transition succeeded. The IANA functions continued operating without disruption, and the new stewardship arrangements have remained in place for a decade.

Today, the functions are performed by Public Technical Identifiers (PTI), an ICANN affiliate established as part of the transition. Accountability is maintained through service agreements, customer committees and review processes developed by the communities that rely on IANA.

The transition demonstrated something broader: that governments, businesses, civil society and the technical community could work together to make decisions about critical global infrastructure without placing it under the control of any single actor.

That approach continues to receive international support. In December 2025, the UN General Assembly concluded its twenty-year review of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS+20) by consensus. The outcome reaffirmed the multistakeholder approach to Internet governance and gave the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) a permanent mandate.

Continued pressure on the Internet's core

The contractual oversight by the US Government over the IANA function terminated ten years ago, but the pressures on the Internet’s core infrastructure and processes have not gone away. We have seen new pressures and conditions emerge over the last ten years which have affected the environment in which the Internet and its governance models operate.

Fragmentation and digital sovereignty

Governments increasingly seek greater control over digital infrastructure, data and networks. Some approaches to digital sovereignty can strengthen resilience and reduce dependencies. Others risk creating technical or political barriers between national and regional networks.

A single, globally coordinated DNS root is one of the foundations of an Internet that works consistently across borders. Preserving that coordination does not mean rejecting legitimate national security concerns. It means finding ways to address them without undermining the shared infrastructure on which everyone depends.

Cybersecurity regulation

The Internet's core needs to be based on international cooperation, but since regulation is, by nature, limited by national or federal borders, operators need to navigate an uncoordinated plethora of local specifications. One example is Europe's NIS2 directive. NIS2 and national legislation have brought greater regulatory attention to critical Internet infrastructure, including Internet exchange points and DNS services. Stronger cybersecurity requirements are important. But regulation needs to reflect how the underlying systems operate and the global context they are part of.

Infrastructure that is globally distributed and operated by independent organisations does not always fit existing regulatory models.

The treatment of DNS root servers under NIS2 illustrates the importance of dialogue between policymakers and the technical community.

The European Commission's original proposal for what was to become NIS2 included DNS root servers within the directive's scope. During the legislative process, members of the technical community provided expert input on how the globally coordinated root server system operates and the potential consequences of applying regional regulatory requirements to it. The European Parliament and Council subsequently agreed to exclude DNS root servers from the final directive.

The outcome illustrates how technical expertise can inform regulation without replacing public oversight. Decisions about regulatory scope remain with governments and policymakers, while operators have a responsibility to explain how their infrastructure works, identify potential risks and contribute to effective security requirements. The best results are reached when governments and the technical community work together and listen to each other.

The next decade: keeping the Internet open and resilient

The IANA transition did not bring the work of Internet stewardship to an end. It established a model in which responsibility is shared and in which continued cooperation is essential. That was a remarkable achievement made possible by cooperation across the global Internet community.

The next decade will bring different challenges, from geopolitical fragmentation to new demands for security, accountability and national control. Meeting them will require the same willingness to combine technical expertise, open processes and shared responsibility.

The IANA transition showed what the Internet community – including governments – could achieve together. Protecting the Internet's core and building a resilient digital future will require the same commitment to cooperation and long-term stewardship.